A Brief Note on Substantive Equality of Opportunity (as adapted from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

One problem with formal equality of opportunity is that it’s merely formal. Imagine a society ruled by a hereditary warrior class. Reformers bring about a change. From now on, membership in the warrior class will be based on merit. However, only the children of the rich eat well. Hence only they evince physical prowess. So one might object that only the rich have a shot: the fix is in, in effect.

So the argument would be that genuine equality of opportunity requires that all have a real chance at qualification. And we can imagine the fixes: say, nutrition supplements to be given to all those who need them. At some point the complaint that only the wealthy have a chance to enter the warrior class begins to sound hollow. At some point it might be that sufficient or good enough opportunities have been provided to all. The idea is that substantive equality of opportunity is met when the requirements for merit are satisfied by social policy leveling the merit playing field for the competitors.

The question of how much assistance is satisfactory is a real one but the weighing of costs and benefits in arriving at a balanced judgment about that does not detract from the preliminary and foundational need for amelioration to allow for some measure of equality of opportunity. (I don’t dwell on but note that the Rawlsian idea of “equality of fair opportunity” (“efo”) goes way too far—and doesn’t much interest me— in seeking to compensate for innate differences that go to merit once the demand of substantive equality has been satisfied. For one example, to implement efo, even if that were conceivable, would require extensive and nightmare meddling by government.)