issue estoppel and abuse of process

http://www.canlii.org/eliisa/highlight.do?text=abuse+of+process+estoppel&language=en&searchTitle=Federal+-+Supreme+Court+of+Canada&path=/en/ca/scc/doc/2003/2003scc63/2003scc63.html

The S.C.C. on issue estoppel and abuse of process: from the headnote:
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"O worked as a recreation instructor for the respondent City. He was charged with sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision. He pleaded not guilty. At trial before a judge alone, he testified and was cross-examined. The trial judge found that the complainant was credible and that O was not. He entered a conviction, which was affirmed on appeal. The City fired O a few days after his conviction. O grieved the dismissal. At the arbitration hearing, the City submitted the complainant’s testimony from the criminal trial and the notes of O’s supervisor, who had spoken to the complainant at the time. The complainant was not called to testify. O testified, claiming that he had never sexually assaulted the boy. The arbitrator ruled that the criminal conviction was admissible evidence, but that it was not conclusive as to whether O had sexually assaulted the boy. No fresh evidence was introduced. The arbitrator held that the presumption raised by the criminal conviction had been rebutted, and that O had been dismissed without just cause. The Divisional Court quashed the arbitrator’s ruling. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

Per McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie and Arbour JJ.: When asked to decide whether a criminal conviction, prima facie admissible in a proceeding under s. 22.1 of the Ontario Evidence Act, ought to be rebutted or taken as conclusive, courts will turn to the doctrine of abuse of process to ascertain whether relitigation would be detrimental to the adjudicative process. The doctrine engages the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It has been applied to preclude relitigation in circumstances where the strict requirements of issue estoppel are not met, but where allowing litigation to proceed would nonetheless violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice. The motive of the party who seeks to relitigate, and the capacity in which he or she does so, cannot be decisive factors in the application of the bar against relitigation. What is improper is to attempt to impeach a judicial finding by the impermissible route of relitigation in a different forum. A proper focus on the process, rather than on the interests of a party, will reveal why relitigation should not be permitted. From the system’s point of view, relitigation carries serious detrimental effects and should be avoided unless the circumstances dictate that relitigation is necessary to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole. Casting doubt over the validity of a criminal conviction is a very serious matter. Collateral attacks and relitigation are not appropriate methods of redress since they inordinately tax the adjudicative process while doing nothing to ensure a more trustworthy result. The common law doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack and abuse of process adequately capture the concerns that arise when finality in litigation must be balanced against fairness to a particular litigant. There is no need to endorse a self-standing and independent “principle of finality” as either a separate doctrine or as an independent test to preclude relitigation.

The appellant union was not entitled, either at common law or under statute, to relitigate the issue decided against the grievor in the criminal proceedings. The facts in this appeal point to the blatant abuse of process that results when relitigation of this sort is permitted. O was convicted in a criminal court and he exhausted all his avenues of appeal. In law, his conviction must stand, with all its consequent legal effects. There is nothing in this case that militates against the application of the doctrine of abuse of process to bar the relitigation of O’s criminal conviction. The arbitrator was required as a matter of law to give full effect to the conviction.

As a result of that error of law, the arbitrator reached a patently unreasonable conclusion. Properly understood in the light of correct legal principles, the evidence before the arbitrator could only lead him to conclude that the respondent City had established just cause for O’s dismissal.

Issue estoppel has no application in this case since the requirement of mutuality of parties has not been met. With respect to the collateral attack doctrine, the appellant does not seek to overturn the sexual abuse conviction itself, but rather contest, for the purposes of a different claim with different legal consequences, whether the conviction was correct."
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My comment:

Issue estoppel is a rule under the principle of abuse of process. My question is whether the functional analysis abuse of process calls for can lead to an outcome different from the outcome compelled by meeting the requirements of the rule. That is an instance opposite to the facts of this case when abuse of process stops duplicative proceedings despite the rule's demands not being met--here there no being no party mutuality.

Itzik Basman