Thursday, April 21, 2011

Deductive and Inductive Reasoning and the Law

Jack:

OK, start with Kiekegaard: Life is understood backwards but can only be lived forward.

By "understood" is meant to be made to conform to rules of deductive reasoning.

In life, as opposed to court, one decides a course of action based on induction or synthesis, which is greater than the sum of its parts

Deduction, on which hindsight is based, can only consider the parts. That is, a judgment reached by deduction is not the same as a judgment reached by induction

That is, a judgment reached by deduction is not the same as a judgment reached by induction or, judgment by analysis is not the same as judgment by synthesis.

Courts admit only analysis even though actions being judged were based on synthesis

Thus the court is judging the defendant based on a mode of reasoning unavailable to him at the time and thus fundamentally unjust.

Which begs the question: What's the alternative?

A start, though not the solution, would be to replace the adversarial system with the inquisitorial system, which trial lawyers naturally would find anathema, since they would all rather that their judges be potted plants.

As said, this wouldn't end the problem of hindsight justice, but would help mitigate the Jarndyce and Jarndyce form of endless parenthesis which fuel the fee meters.

Btw, if the "reasonable person" standard truly obtained, then we'd not have the likes of the McDonalds coffee case which scandalizes all reasonable people...excepting lawyers, whose courts they regard as hermetic repositories of reason.

Of course, that's just my opinion. I could be wrong.

Me:

I’m not sure I have taken in all or any your nuances based on how compressed your assertions are. But, to start, in my pedestrian, simple minded way let me try to clarify a few things.

Deductive reasoning is from the general to A particular. “It’s raining. Therefore, the streets will be wet.” Inductive reasoning is from A particular to the general. “The streets are all wet. Therefore it must have rained.”

You are saying we live by going forward based on our more general conclusions drawn from past particular observations. That is to say, you say, as we go forward our expectations will, we think, conform to what we have observed. Induction, you say, plays no part in this. You say, I think, inductive synthesis is to judgment as deductive analysis is to judgment.

I don’t understand this at all, if I have your reasoning right. Prosaically, if it’s raining, I wear my boots because the streets will be wet. If it’s overcast, I take my umbrella because it’s likely to rain. We “live forward”/go forward based both on inductive and deductive reasoning. They’re different kinds of reasoning but are without a difference for going forward, I argue.

It’s inaccurate to say “Courts admit only analysis even though actions being judged were based on synthesis” if I understand this. Courts admit evidence. Courts find facts based on the evidence, which is essentially a process of drawing conclusory inferences.

There may be a factual issue whether at x time the roads were wet. There may be evidence that it rained just before x time. There may be an issue whether it was raining at x time. There may be evidence that just after x time the roads were wet. As well experts opine on all kinds of factual questions. That’s called expert evidence. Sometimes their reasoning to their opinions is inductive; sometimes it’s deductive. So your assertion does not hold.

Neither does your assertion nor your question, accordingly, if I understand them: “Thus the court is judging the defendant based on a mode of reasoning unavailable to him at the time and thus fundamentally unjust. Which begs the question: What's the alternative?”

There are a lot of contending pros and cons about the adversarial system against the inquisitorial systems of administering justice, and I need to know more about the latter, but they are not helped by misconceivedly calling judges “potted plants,” referring to “hindsight justice” and “hermetic repositories of reason,” each of which mischaracterizations can be easily shown as such.

Finally, you say, “Of course, that's just my opinion. I could be wrong.” Bingo!


No comments:

Post a Comment