More Still

Me:

Ben and Rick:

Gordon says that Oslo and what she calls its “’peace process’ culture” has worsened Israel’s world regard. She says the Oslo mentality ceded legitimacy to her claims to the West Bank and Gaza and found form in Israel’s own leaders referring to her “occupation.” I don’t think she thinks the pre and post Oslo international standing compares the actual to the theoretical. I think she’s explicit that things are worse now—“unprecedented low”. I’ve noted that Ben makes a good point in complaining that Gordon engages in no pre and post Oslo comparison but merely states her assertion as though it’s self evident. But I continue to think that her general argument—regardless of the weakness Ben points to—is better than that criticism.

Not to quibble over words, but I think, and I think Gordon would say, the Oslo ceding was more than “tactics”. It was a strategic decision to relinquish legitimacy as part of the then quest for peace. And its importance--the claim to legitmacy, transcending tactics--shows itself in the kind of arguments that Israel does, and will, advance in negotiations over East Jerusalem and the settlement communities adjacent to Jerusalem. It showed itself in, for example, Obama’s Cairo speech and the response to it by Netanyahu and in the call for total settlement freeze and the response to that call.

I think Gordon’s position is more subtle than simply asserting a claim to the West Bank and Gaza, though she’s not clear enough. She says:

“…First, Israel and its supporters must reiterate Israel’s own claim to the territories at every opportunity. While many have grown accustomed to disavowing Israel’s right to this land, Israelis of all political stripes were outraged by President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech, in which the only justification for the existence of a Jewish state was assumed to be the Holocaust—while the Jews’ historical claim to the land of Israel was thrown down the memory hole. By taking this stand, Obama may have unwittingly provided the impetus for reviving a broad-based assertion of Jewish rights. For instance, on July 17, the left-wing Haaretz’s star columnist Yoel Marcus wrote that Obama’s “disregard of our historical connection to the land of Israel” was “extremely upsetting.” Marcus concluded that “as a leader who aspires to solve the problems of the world through dialogue, we expect him to come to Israel and declare here courageously, before the entire world, that our connection to this land began long before the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Holocaust, and that 4,000 years ago, Jews already stood on the ground where he now stands.” If even a hard-core Oslo supporter such as Marcus can be provoked into reasserting Israel’s claim to the land, then there is hope for reviving such sentiments across the Israeli political spectrum…”

Her point is a continuum between ceding legitimacy to the “territories” and the right of Israel proper to exist. When Obama spoke of Israel as a consequence of the Holocaust he fueled the canard that she is but a colonial-like imposition on the Palestinians by the Western powers. If an important reason for Israel’s legitimacy is Jews’ deep and long historical connection to the lands, then that reason applies to the territories as well. Deny the latter, and then the former becomes more fragile. Assert the latter, then the former gains strength.

That is why Gordon cites Oslo-favoring Israeli journalist Yoel Marcus’s outcry against Obama’s eliding that connection. Marcus supports the Oslo ceding. So Gordon is guilty of running the territories and Israel together in enlisting his outcry as a support. But she does so, for all that running together, out of her point.

Also, she is not, as Rick suggests, simply calling for a reanimation of these claims and saying “that’s that”. She rather folds that call into her argument for a better approach by seeking to make peace at a better time, under better circumstances. Therefore, she says earlier in her essay, “None of this precludes an Israeli cession of these areas…”; and later she says, with a nod to her approach: “Second, Israel must cede no more land until the Palestinians prove they can and will keep it from becoming a base for anti-Israel terror.” So it’s not just a simple assertion of claims by her. And her notion of “how”--hardly easily answered-- seems evident in her confidence in Netanyahu.

Ben, having further considered Gordon’s essay in light of your criticisms, I’m inclined to concede you some ground. So, I’ll take your point “that her stated thesis is flawed”: I’m pulling out of Gaza unilaterally with an eye on the West Bank, though never to give up East Jerusalem. But think about her essay this way: say she had tamped down her thesis and say she had been more balanced about how bad things were before Oslo and about the goods that came from Oslo—all fair criticisms, what do you quarrel with in her subsequent analysis and in her prescriptions?

Your line of reasoning is that since she can’t/doesn’t make a case for “worse”, she can’t make a policy case based on “worse”. But I say she can, not based on "worse", but based on the coexistence of Israel’s bad world regard and the failures of the pre-Netanyahu pursuit of peace as she concretely argues.

That’s why it seems rigid to me and to miss some of what’s in her essay to say that it flows from her reasoning that Netanyahu would be to blame for further disregard since his election. That doesn’t necessarily follow. I read her to see in Netanyahu a different approach based on a claim of legitimacy and right, still wanting a two state solution but not willing to move to final status until there is a basis for doing so.