Three Of Robert Nozick’s Arguments Against John Rawls’ A Theory Of Justice

 Three arguments of Nozick against Rawls:

1. The experience machine thought experiment is where you can hook up to a machine for life that will immerse you completely in whatever you want as most pleasing or fulfilling. Most people would rather live their real lives, no matter how contingent. For there is, it seems, axiomatic transcendent importance and value for us in experiencing our actual lives. This provides an argument against utilitarianism—maximize pleasure and minimize pain—and, relevant here, an argument against the omnivorous, redistributionist, all providing state, which can be analogized to the experience machine in taking from us the actuality of our lives. 

2. The Wilt Chamberlain thought experiment is where we construct a society in which everyone starts from an equal financial position. There is no inequality. But along comes supremely talented  Wilt Chamberlain who will play basketball for people who will pay him a dollar to watch. Eventually, because he’s so good and fills a demand in so many people to see his excellence, he becomes wealthy. Others may be more deserving in the work they do, but who can say he’s not entitled to what he’s earned. So a big point here is that even starting from perfect financial equality, talent and catering to paying demand will inevitably create differences over time and inequality will always be a condition of our social life. And to take what Wilt Chamberlain has earned and redistribute it to maintain equality or minimize inequality is to stifle human freedom and individual flourishing. It would be akin to enslavement.

3. The ugly man thought experiment is most directly put up against Rawls. Rawls argues that all human difference is morally arbitrary and that we don’t deserve the successes we have. We may be born into advantageous circumstances or with special abilities or talents or good looks and so on. So if we were to ask, not knowing how we’d fare in life, from “a veil of ignorance,” what kind of society we’d want, we’d say let the least among us, which could easily be any of us, have enough to allow for a secure, safe, comfortable life and then after that, those blessed with what allows them to earn more have more than those most in need and who by redistribution get their needs met. Nozick posits this though: imagine a beautiful, desirable woman whose hand is sought by two men. Both men have good personalities, are equally wealthy and healthy, and are equally charming. But one is handsome and the other is ugly. The woman chooses the physically attractive man. But then on Rawls’ reasoning, can’t the ugly man demand plastic surgery to equalize their looks? Or can’t he demand that the handsome man be made more ugly? Isn’t a happy marriage to someone you truly desire a human need? The handsome man has been lucky in his looks and by that is getting what he needs to the complete exclusion of the ugly man. So a big point here is how far will the state go to balance need and morally arbitrary entitlement? Not all significant need is satisfied financially and morally arbitrary qualities favour the fulfillment of these needs at the expense of those impoverished by lacking those qualities. So what principle limits Rawlsian redistribution?